

reasons, one of them being the small size of the building. There was resistance, but Bowie's arguments were powerfully reinforced by Michael Wörrle, and it is now generally conceded that this small temple had nothing to do with the provincial cult of the emperor, and was perhaps not for his worship at all.<sup>22</sup>

Hardly had the temple on the Embolos been discounted as the Hadrianeion than a new candidate came into view. In 1972 a trench was dug for 70 metres north of the Church of Mary and uncovered a large terrace similar to that of the sanctuary of Domitian. Subsequent excavation has shown that the Church incorporates part of the south hall or portico of the newly discovered complex. The date is the second century, and the excavators are satisfied that the building is the Olympieion, which they assume to be identical with the Hadrianeion.<sup>23</sup> As has been seen, though, Pausanias locates the Olympieion outside the Lysimachean city; it appears to have been founded already in the reign of Domitian, and perhaps well before; and the arguments for identifying it with the Hadrianeion do not withstand scrutiny. The new building may well be the Hadrianeion, however, and if so a remark made by Ewen Bowie in 1971, one year before this building began to be uncovered, proves prophetic: 'the small proportion of Ephesus that has as yet been uncovered makes it not impossible that another building which may be satisfactorily identified with [the temple of Hadrian] may one day be found'.<sup>24</sup>

As for the Olympieion, this must have been where Pausanias puts it, outside the Lysimachean city, on the east side of the Panayırdağ: whether it was between the Magnesians Gate and the structure identified by Wood with the Tomb of Androclos, or rather between the latter and the Artemision, is a question only to be answered by investigation on the ground.

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<sup>22</sup> F. Miltner, *JOEAI* xliv (1959) Beibl. 264-66; Bowie, 'Temple of Hadrian' 137-41; Wörrle (n. 17), 470-77; Price, *Rituals* 255-56.

<sup>23</sup> See now St. Karwiese, *Die Marienkirche in Ephesos: Erster vorläufiger Grabungsbericht 1984-1986*, Denkschr. Akad. Wien cc (Vienna 1989), Index s.v. Olympieion; for previous reports, *Anz. Wien* cx (1973) 178-80; cxxi (1984) 210-211; cxxiii (1987) 84; cxxv (1988) 91-92. For the Church of Mary, see Alzinger, *RE* suppl. xii (1970), plan facing col. 1584, no. 6. Karwiese's view is strongly endorsed by S. Mitchell in *AR 1989-1990*, 100; Rogers, *Sacred identity* 104, is more reserved.

<sup>24</sup> Bowie, 'Temple of Hadrian' 141.

### Athenian campaigns in Karia and Lykia during the Peloponnesian War<sup>1</sup>

In memory of J.D. Smart

Thucydides (ii 9.4) records among the allies of Athens in 431 'coastal Karia and the Dorians living near the Karians'.<sup>2</sup> All Karia and Lykia had been brought into the Delian League after the campaigns of Kimon that culminated in the battle of the Eurymedon. A number of Karian towns then appeared in the tribute lists in the mid-fifth century, but disappeared again sometime after 440.<sup>3</sup> The evidence of the tribute lists, however, presents a range of communities which were still paying during the Peloponnesian War,<sup>4</sup> and to this can almost certainly be added Keramos, which paid tribute in 432/1 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 280.i.31).

Further east in Lykia it is clear that there also remained some allies; Thucydides may have meant them to be included in the Karians he mentions, since he seems to list the allies according to their tribute districts (the Lykian states were always included in the Karian district).<sup>5</sup> One Lykian ally, Phaselis, is mentioned on the war-time tribute lists (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 290.i.17). Another location in Lykia, Phoinike, is mentioned by Thucydides (ii 69.1) as the starting point for merchantmen bound for Athens.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Earlier versions of this paper have been delivered as seminars at the University of Keele and the University of Manchester. I should like to thank all those who attended the seminars and voiced their comments on the paper, and also Dr S.J. Hodkinson, Prof. H.C. Melchert, and Prof. Sommerstein and the anonymous referees of *JHS* for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. All mistakes, of course, remain my own. Further discussion of some of the points raised in this paper can be found in A.G. Keen, *A political history of Lycia and its relations with foreign powers* (Ph.D. diss., Manchester 1992).

<sup>2</sup> Note, however, the view of J.D. Smart, *GRBS* xviii (1977) 33-42 that the whole of Th. ii 9 has been interpolated. See also S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides* i (Oxford 1991) 247-8.

<sup>3</sup> See the register in B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery & M.F. McGregor, *The Athenian tribute lists* (Harvard & Princeton 1939-51) (henceforth referred to as *ATL*) i 215-441 for details of who paid and when, though this should be read in conjunction with the inscriptions as published in *IG* i<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Aulai (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 282.iv.36; 290.i.3); Halikarnassos (282.iv.15); Iasos (283.iii.26; 284.4; 285.i.91; 289.i.35; 290.i.12); Kalynda (281.i.10; 290.i.19); Karbasyanda (281.i.29; 282.iv.39; 285.ii.13-14); Kaunos (285.ii.11); Kedreiai (281.i.18; 283.iii.7; 290.i.20); Keramos (290.i.25); Krya (282.iv.33; 283.ii.28); Myndos (281.i.47—note D.W. Bradeen & M.F. McGregor, *Studies in fifth century Attic epigraphy*, U. Cinn. Class. Stud. iv [1973] 15; 282.iv.37; 283.ii.32; 284.21; 285.i.92-3); Pasanda (281.i.28; 285.ii.12); Syangela (281.iv.48-9; 284.7-8); Termera (290.i.22). The argument about the precise dating of the war-time tribute lists (for which see references in *IG* i<sup>3</sup> p. 277) does not significantly effect the argument here.

<sup>5</sup> Thucydides' listing of the allies by districts: T. Wiedemann, *Thucydides I-II 65* (Bristol 1985) 65; J.S. Rusten (ed.), *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War II* (Cambridge 1989) 108; Hornblower (n. 2) 248; extent of the Karian district: *ATL* i 496.

<sup>6</sup> The identification of Φοινίκη as a site on the Lykian coast rather than as 'Phoenicia' is convincingly argued in two independent articles by A.W. Dickinson, *CQ* n.s. xxix (1979) 213-14 and K. Buschmann, *EA* xii (1988) 1-4; see now Hornblower (n. 2) 355-6.

If Phoinike is correctly identified with the modern town of Finike,<sup>7</sup> this implies Athenian connections with the important east-Lyikian city of Limyra, of which Finike was the port;<sup>8</sup> such connections are further suggested by the name of a later ruler of Limyra, Perikles, who may well have acquired his name through family connections with Athens.<sup>9</sup>

From the evidence of the tribute lists it would appear that whilst Karia was a collection of independent states, with no political unity beyond the occasional local union,<sup>10</sup> Lykia formed a single political unit. The one appearance of the Lykians on the tribute lists that is not wholly a restoration speaks of 'the Lykians and their associates' (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 266.iii.34: Λύκιοι καὶ συν[τελ]); none of the important cities of the Xanthos valley are otherwise attested on the lists. Who or what exactly the 'associates' were is not clear; possibly what was meant was Xanthos and dependent cities in Lykia. The important point is that the Athenians were clearly dealing with the Lykians as one group, and this concurs with other evidence which suggests that in the sixth to fourth centuries Lykia was a single nation, ruled from the city of Xanthos.<sup>11</sup>

In 430/29 the Athenians despatched Melesandros to bring Karia and Lykia back under Athenian control (*Th.* ii 69). It has been suggested that arrears of tribute were to be collected, but the Greek at this point, ἀργυρολογῶσι, does not imply arrears.<sup>12</sup> Lykia had paid tribute in the 440s (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 261.i.29-30; 262.v.32-3; 266.iii.34) and it may be true that some arrears would have been demanded; but it is unlikely that they were sought in full. As Lykia is definitely absent from the well-preser-

ved tribute lists of 442/1 to 440/39<sup>13</sup> the Lykians must have ceased paying before then. The only amount recorded was ten talents in 446/5 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 266.iii.34); assuming that this was the usual payment, the Lykians would by 430/29 owe at least a hundred talents. The rulers of Lykia are unlikely to have had such large monies readily available (although it should be remembered that later in the war Alkibiades was able to extract a hundred talents from Karia in less than a year, albeit with a somewhat larger fleet; *X. HG* i 4.8-9).

Nonetheless, although both Lykia and those Karian cities that had departed from the League in the 440s would owe arrears, there is no direct evidence in Thucydides that these were to be collected. All that can safely be said is that the cities of Karia and Lykia that had once been in the tribute system were to be brought in again. The amount of tribute that might realistically be expected from Karia and Lykia might not, however, seem to justify such an expedition, especially as the force was perhaps unusually large for a tribute-collecting fleet,<sup>14</sup> though fairly small for an invasion force. It is, however, true that the Athenians had spent nearly four thousand talents of their reserves by the end of the year 430/29.<sup>15</sup>

Thucydides gives another reason for the expedition, to prevent the region being used as a base for 'Peloponnesian pirates'. Buschmann believes that these privateers were 'die Spartaner selbst', since Lykia was within the Spartan range of action in 412 (*Th.* viii 41).<sup>16</sup> It seems, however, most unlikely that these were actual forces from the Peloponnese; such forces would hardly have been able in 430 to cross the Aegean safely. Perhaps, as has been suggested, they were small vessels of local origin that would prey upon Athenian merchantmen, described as 'Peloponnesian' purely because they happened to be serving Sparta's interests.<sup>17</sup> These privateers, however, are never heard of again.

Nor indeed are the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoinike, although later vessels from Egypt are mentioned (*Th.* viii 35.2), which probably travelled along the Lykian coast. What were these vessels carrying? The comic poet Hermippos lists as standard imports into Athens paper and sailcloth from Egypt and dates and wheatflour from Phoenicia (*fr.* 63.12-13, 22-3), all of which would have probably come past the Lykian coast; but of these only sailcloth and wheatflour would be vital materials for the war effort. It has been suggested that these vessels were bringing ship-timber from eastern Lykia,<sup>18</sup> which again is possible; but since the failure of

<sup>7</sup> Dickinson (n. 6) 213-14.

<sup>8</sup> *Vita Nicolai Sionitae* 37.5 describes Phoinix (Finike) as the port of Myra, almost certainly a mistake for Limyra.

<sup>9</sup> On Perikles see now J. Borchhardt, *IstMitt* xl (1990) 109-10.

<sup>10</sup> For smaller Karian κοινά, see P.M. Fraser & G.E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and islands* (Oxford 1954) 50; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 53-5. There was a Karian League (Hornblower [n. 10] 55-62), but this seems to have been largely religious in nature and not to have played any major role in the relations of Athens with individual Karian cities.

<sup>11</sup> It has been suggested to me that the political implication of συν[τελ] is not wholly secure; it could mean strictly 'paying together' (*cf.* T.R. Bryce, *The Lycians* i [Copenhagen 1986] 105). If such a joint payment was an Athenian-promoted measure, this begs the question of why similar groupings are not found in Karia; if it was Lykian-promoted, then it must surely imply some form of localized political structure. For the evidence for Lykian unity, see Keen (n. 1), esp. 29-30.

<sup>12</sup> Though so translated by C.F. Smith (ed.), *Thucydides* i (Harvard 1951) 385; E. Marchant (ed.), *Thucydides: Book II*<sup>3</sup> (Bristol 1984) 214; *cf.* also Buschmann (n. 6) 1 n. 3. P.J. Rhodes (ed.), *Thucydides: History II* (Warminster 1988) 249, points out that the same language is used at *Th.* iii 19 and iv 50.1, where, he suggests (following R. Meiggs, *The Athenian empire* [corrected ed., Oxford 1975] 254), it is probably special imposts that are being collected; this is rejected by Hornblower (n. 2) 355. D.M. Lewis, 'Sources, chronology, method', *CAH*<sup>2</sup> v (Cambridge 1992) 5, suggests that the despatch of ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες might be annual occurrences that Thucydides mentions only when an important event occurs in connection with them.

<sup>13</sup> *ATL* i 334.

<sup>14</sup> D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca 1974) 97.

<sup>15</sup> R. Meiggs & D.M. Lewis, *Greek historical inscriptions*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1988) 217. According to *Th.* ii 13.3, reserves in 431 stood at six thousand talents; see now D.M. Lewis, 'The Archidamian War', *CAH*<sup>2</sup> v (Cambridge 1992) 385.

<sup>16</sup> Buschmann (n. 6) 6; W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek state at war* v (Berkeley 1991) 328-9 also assumes that the vessels had come from the Peloponnese.

<sup>17</sup> H.A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the ancient world* (Liverpool 1928) 111; see now Hornblower (n. 2) 355.

<sup>18</sup> Dickinson (n. 6) 214; Buschmann (n. 6) 6. Lykia was known in antiquity for its cedar (*Thphr. HP* iii 12.4; *Plin. Nat.* xii 61; xiii 11; xvi 59), cypress (*Thphr. HP* iv 5.2) and plane (*Plin. Nat.* xii 5); see R. Meiggs, *Trees and timber in the ancient Mediterranean world* (Oxford 1982) 46.




FIG. 1 KARIA AND LYKIA

- |                      |             |              |                |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1. Ephesos           | 7. Syangela | 13. Kalynda  | 19. Limyra     |
| 2. Sandios?          | 8. Keramos  | 14. Krya     | 20. Phaselis   |
| 3. Iasos             | 9. Kedreiai | 15. Tlos     | 21. Aspendos   |
| 4. Myndos by Termera | 10. Syme    | 16. Xanthos  | 22. Kelenderis |
| 5. Termera           | 11. Chalke  | 17. Myra     |                |
| 6. Halikarnassos     | 12. Kaunos  | 18. Phoinike |                |

Melesandros' expedition seems to have caused little harm to Athens' capacity for shipbuilding, either these vessels were not intercepted or, if they were, the supply of ship timber from Lykia was not very significant. The question of Athenian motivation remains open. Even combined with bringing in some more tribute, Melesandros' expedition seems an unnecessary extravagance. Grain may well have been an important reason for the Athenian action; Athens may well have been looking towards Egyptian grain as an alternative to the vulnerable Black Sea route, and control of Lykia would assist the safe transport of such grain.<sup>19</sup>

There may well, however, have been a more directly military reason for this expedition. The trireme of the Classical period, whether Greek or Phoenician, could not venture far from the coastline, since it had to return to shore at the end of each day for the purpose of beaching, renewing provisions, etc., and did not convey a sufficient number of troops to be able to function off a

hostile shore. Furthermore, it had an effective range of no more than c. 230 kilometres per day.<sup>20</sup> The only reasonable route that a trireme fleet could take from the eastern Mediterranean to the Aegean passed along the coast of Lykia, and necessitated at least one stop in Lykia; furthermore, the political unity of Lykia made this section of coastline comparatively easy to control. A good example of what could happen when a fleet got as far west as Karia is seen in 412, when in order to cover the possible movements of a Spartan fleet at Kaunos the Athenian commander Charminos was forced to place ships off the coasts of Lykia and the islands of

<sup>19</sup> See Pritchett (n. 16) 465-72 for the importance of grain in Athenian strategic thinking. S. Hornblower, *The Greek world 479-323 BC*<sup>2</sup> (London 1991) 40-1, argues for interest in Egyptian corn being behind the Athenian expedition there in the 450s. P. Garnsey, *Famine and food supply in the Graeco-Roman world* (Cambridge 1988) 124, acknowledges the role of the grain route in Perikleian strategy.

<sup>20</sup> Further on this point see A.W. Gomme, *Essays in Greek history and literature* (Oxford 1937) 190-203; B. Jordan, *The Athenian navy in the Classical period*, U. Cal. Pubs. in Classics xiii (1975) 106-11, however, argues that Gomme oversimplifies the matter of supply. See also J.S. Morrison & J.F. Coates, *The Athenian trireme* (Cambridge 1986) 94-106; and with special reference to Lykia, A.G. Keen, 'Gateway to the Aegean to the Mediterranean', J. Borchhardt & G. Dobesch (eds.), *Akten des II. Internationalen Lykien-Symposiums* i (Vienna 1993) 71-7.

Chalke, Syme and Rhodes (Th. viii 41.4);<sup>21</sup> if a fleet was further east only the coast of Lykia need be covered.

The most likely purpose for this expedition was to win over Lykia and so gain control of the coastal route, as the Athenians had when Kimon had taken the shoreline in c. 470. Karia was a necessary starting point for a land invasion of Lykia and a guard for its western half. This expedition fits into a pattern which can be seen operating in this part of Asia Minor from the Late Bronze Age right up to the seventeenth century AD; the clearest example is that of the Lykian campaign of Alexander the Great, where Arrian (*An.* i 24.3) specifically refers to the occupation of ports as Alexander's objective.<sup>22</sup> It should be emphasized that 'control' does not mean the establishment of an occupying force; rather a demonstration of military power was to persuade the inhabitants of Lykia that siding with Athens would be the wiser course of action. According to Thucydides, Melesandros on his arrival in Karia collected allies before marching further inland. It is not clear how many of these 'allies' were pro-Athenian before the arrival of Melesandros' force.<sup>23</sup> A Lykian document of c. 400, the imperfectly understood 'Inscribed Pillar' of Xanthos (*TAM* i 44), which mentions Melesandros (line a.45),<sup>24</sup> may imply that he had support from the city of Tlos in the north Xanthos valley.

Athens' action must have been primarily concerned with Persia. Both sides in the Peloponnesian War clearly recognized the potential for a Persian intervention (note Th. ii 7.1). It must have been obvious that the Peace of Kallias<sup>25</sup> would hold only up to the moment that the Persians judged it opportune to intervene. Persia had made overtures to Sparta during the First Peloponnesian War (Th. i 109.2-3) and in 430 Spartan envoys had been captured in Thrace whilst preparing to cross over to Asia (Th. ii 67.1). The Athenians must have feared that other envoys could have got through, and hoped that if they controlled the naval route into the Aegean they could

keep the Persians from intervening successfully. The fact that the expedition was sent out in winter, when sailing conditions were at their worst,<sup>26</sup> shows that the matter was one of some urgency.

Thucydides is perhaps recording the official motives for the expedition; since the Athenians had a negotiated peace with the Persians, they could hardly publicly declare that they were taking action in anticipation of hostilities. Therefore they gave other reasons, which had to be plausible (this has a bearing on the question of piracy in the area; clearly the Athenians must have felt that it would be believed that pirates were a sufficient threat that action should be taken against them<sup>27</sup>). It is certainly unlikely that strategic interests played no part in the despatch of Melesandros.

This expedition ended disastrously for the Athenians, with the death of Melesandros and the destruction of a portion of his army. In 428 the Athenians launched a second expedition, despatching the general Lysikles, who seems to have been a figure of some importance,<sup>28</sup> with twelve ships and four other generals (Th. iii 19). Again, Thucydides' reason is that the Athenians wished to collect money, this time specifically for the siege of Mytilene, but the fact that Lysikles' expedition started from exactly the same place as Melesandros' (Paus. i 29.7) may be significant; it is very possible that the intention was once again to seize control of Karia and Lykia, although the authors of *ATL* suggest that the expedition was directed at former Athenian tributaries in the Maiandros valley.<sup>29</sup> The expedition of Lysikles was even less successful than that of Melesandros; he managed to get no further than the lower Maiandros valley before he was killed by the Karians at Sandios.<sup>30</sup> It is not unlikely that the disaster of Melesandros had encouraged some of the outlying Karian states to throw off their allegiance to Athens; a revolt of Kaunos (Ctes. *FGrH* 688 F 14.45) may possibly fall into the early 420s.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps more surprising is that the tribute records of the coastal Karian states seem to indicate that they remained fairly loyal during this period.

It has been suggested that the tribute assessment of 428, part of which Lysikles would have been collecting, was increased from the pre-war level;<sup>32</sup> if so, this paved

<sup>21</sup> Andrewes in A.W. Gomme, *Historical commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1945-81) v 88 suggests that Thucydides is simply defining the limits of Charminos' patrol area, but it seems much more likely that Charminos had picked out the routes by which the Spartan fleet would have to leave Kaunos and covered each with a small squadron.

<sup>22</sup> See Keen (n. 20) 76 & n. 46.

<sup>23</sup> For the plight of small states when faced with military forces from the major Greek powers in their territories, see H.D. Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek history* (Bristol 1989) 113-44.

<sup>24</sup> The suggestion of W.E. Thompson, *Hesperia* xxvi (1967) 105-6, that the Melesandros of Thucydides is a different individual from the Milasāitra of *TAM* i 44.a.45 is doubtful. A good modern treatment of the Pillar as a whole is lacking, but see Keen (n. 1) 166-74 for some of the historical issues relating to this passage.

<sup>25</sup> This is not the place to go into the debate on the Peace of Kallias, for recent work on which see K. Meister, *Die Ungesichtigkeitlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens* (Stuttgart 1982), with a bibliography of previous treatments at 124-30; E. Badian, *JHS* cvii (1987) 1-39; A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta* (London 1988) 49-54; and refs. Badian argues convincingly that the Peace was authentic, first concluded in the 460s and renewed in 449 after the failure of Athens' attacks upon Cyprus and Egypt. I have not seen P.N. Stylianou, *Μελέται καὶ υπομνήματα* ii (1989) 339-71.

<sup>26</sup> Rightly drawn attention to by Buschmann (n. 6) 6 n. 30.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. D. xxxv 1-2 for a Phaseliot accused of piracy.

<sup>28</sup> J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1956) no. 9417; Kagan (n. 14) 126; Hornblower (n. 2) 404. According to one tradition, he lived with Perikles' mistress Aspasia after the latter's death (Kallias F 21 K-A; Σ Pl. *Mx.* 235b; Harp. s.v. 'Ἀσπασία'; cf. J.K. Davies, *Athenian propertied families* [Oxford 1971] 458).

<sup>29</sup> *ATL* i 515; these tributaries are known from *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 71.i.133; 259.iii.29; 261.iv.5; 267.v.19.

<sup>30</sup> Probably the hill of Yürüklü, north-east of the modern town of Söke; L. Robert, *Anatolia* iv (1959) 19-22; Hornblower (n. 2) 404-5.

<sup>31</sup> Meiggs (n. 12) 436-7 supports this date; J. Wells, *Studies in Herodotus* (Oxford 1923) 104 and Hornblower (n. 10) 28 n. 176 are in favour of c. 440/39, which is perhaps slightly more plausible.

<sup>32</sup> Meiggs (n. 12) 331; the belief that 428 was an assessment year, however, depends on the assumption that Thucydides only mentioned tribute-collecting ships in assessment years (B.D. Meritt, *Athenian financial documents* [Ann Arbor 1932] 19-20), on which see now Lewis (n. 12) 5.

the way for the massive increase recorded on the assessment decree of 425/4 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 71). Compared with a pre-war assessment of just over one hundred and ten talents, the tribute from the Karian-Ionian district seems to have been something around five hundred talents, an increase made partly by increasing the tribute of current members of the League, but also by including a large number of states which had probably not been part of the Athenian empire for some time.

One common assumption for the sudden reappearance of these long-absent states seems to be that the Athenians, short of money for their war, put together the most optimistic tribute list that they could, including everyone who had ever paid, but never had any serious intention of collecting the money from the more outlying areas.<sup>33</sup> It seems difficult to see what Athens could gain from this, unless it was thought that by publishing this decree they might just persuade these communities to give up some money. If this is true, it would seem a little naive on the Athenians' part—all claiming such places as Aspendos (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 71.ii.156-7) and Kelenderis (ii.146) would do would be to annoy the Persian King, in whose territories these cities lay, for no very good reason.

It seems possible therefore that the intention of this decree was to put the cities of Karia, Lykia and beyond on notice that they were about to be reincorporated into the Athenian empire, and that the Athenians were serious about this and prepared to send ships to demand the money, otherwise they risked losing credibility both at home and overseas. In fact it might possibly be suggested that the planned reincorporation of Kilikia was intended as a first step towards another attempt to take Cyprus, though perhaps this is excessive speculation.<sup>34</sup>

Following the decree of 425/4 there is a gap of close on a decade in which nothing is known of Athens' dealings in south-west Asia Minor; then came Athens' support for the revolt of the Persian Amorges (And. iii 29). This undoubtedly gives rise to the question of why Athens had neglected this area for so long if, as suggested above, it was so important. The reason, assuming that there was no major operation that has gone unrecorded by any of our ancient sources,<sup>35</sup> may be that Athens, engaged as she was in delicate negotiations with Sparta (Th. iv 117-22; v 13-24), wished to avoid any trouble with Persia that might upset this diplomacy. The question that should then be asked is why there was no recorded action subsequent to the Peace of Nikias in 421, to which the answer perhaps should be that the end of the war removed the possibility of Persian interven-

tion; the Athenians had not first attempted to regain Karia and Lykia until hostilities with Sparta had commenced.

Athenian support for Amorges affects this question. The exact date that this support began is impossible to determine.<sup>36</sup> According to Andokides, it predated Persian support for Sparta, which commenced in 412. Some scholars, however, have argued that when Athens was fully committed to her Sicilian expedition it was somewhat rash to support a rebel Persian and risk incurring the wrath of the Great King for very little gain, whilst it has also sometimes been thought that Andokides has distorted the chronology for his own purposes.<sup>37</sup> Scholars in favour of this latter view argue that Thucydides ought to mention support of Amorges earlier if Andokides is correct in saying that it was this support that caused Dareios to intervene on Sparta's side; Athens' support should, so the argument goes, date to a time after Tissaphernes had opened negotiations with Sparta. The question of Athenian foolishness, however, is affected not only by when support for Amorges began, but also by the nature of that support and by whether Athens supported Amorges' father, Pissouthnes, in his revolt (Ctes. F 15.53).

The only strong evidence for the first is in Thucydides' description of the fall of Iasos in 412 (viii 28.2). From this it seems that Athenian support consisted of little more than a commitment to keep hostile ships away from Amorges' territory, and in addition allowing him to use Iasos as a base. The Athenians would have some ships operating in the eastern Aegean anyway, and for a small exertion on their part they had the chance to gain themselves an ally providing at least some sort of a secure front in south-west Asia Minor.

As for support of Pissouthnes, the presence of an Athenian, Lykon, as commander of Pissouthnes' mercenaries does not, as Wade-Gery believes, automatically demonstrate the involvement of the Athenian *demoi*, although Westlake's assertion that Athens 'evidently' provided no support gives the lack of evidence a little too much weight.<sup>38</sup> Hornblower relates the activities of Lykon to those of fourth-century Athenian commanders such as Chabrias and Chares, who may have been controlled unofficially from Athens,<sup>39</sup> but Lykon was bribed by the Persians to desert Pissouthnes, an action which would hardly have been approved of at Athens if his service with Pissouthnes had any form of home approval.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This seems to be the implication behind the discussion in *ATL* i 484 on the tribute assessment of Idrias; see also W. Eberhardt, *Historia* viii (1959) 291-9. It is not the intention of this paper to argue against the view that individual states were included in the assessment on the basis of any state that had ever paid being listed, once the decision to extend the tribute catchment area had been taken. This seems not unlikely, particularly as the Lykian states listed seem to reflect the political realities of two decades previously (Keen [n. 1] 147).

<sup>34</sup> Prof. Sommerstein has brought to my attention the passage in *Ar. Eq.* 173-4, where the eastern limit of Athenian ambition is said to be *Karia*.

<sup>35</sup> Whilst it might be conceivable that Thucydides had passed over such operations (cf. A. Andrewes, *Historia* x [1961] 1-14), it is best not to posit any event totally unsupported by ancient evidence.

<sup>36</sup> The attempt to link support for Amorges with the presence of an Athenian general at Ephesos in 414 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 370.79, as restored by B.D. Meritt, *Hesperia* v [1936] 382), argued by H.T. Wade-Gery in *Athenian studies*, *HSPh* suppl. i (1940) 144-5 (see now Hornblower [n. 19] 139) is rightly rejected by Westlake (n. 23) 105-6 & D. Kagan, *The fall of the Athenian empire* (Ithaca 1987) 30.

<sup>37</sup> For Athenian rashness see e.g. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* iii.2 (Gotha 1901) 1417; Wade-Gery (n. 36) 145. For Andokides' distortion see Westlake (n. 23) 107-8; Kagan (n. 36) 31.

<sup>38</sup> Wade-Gery (n. 36) 144, rejected by Andrewes (n. 35) 4 & n. 10; Westlake (n. 23) 105.

<sup>39</sup> Hornblower (n. 19) 139.

<sup>40</sup> A.R. Burn, *The Cambridge History of Iran* iii (Cambridge 1985) 343, suggests that Tissaphernes may have bribed the Athenian *polis* at the same time.

Unfortunately, Pissouthnes' revolt is undatable. Westlake says that it 'is widely believed to have occurred not long after the death of Artaxerxes in 424', whilst Cook thinks that c. 416 is a likely date.<sup>41</sup> Andrewes suggests that Th. viii 108 implies that Tissaphernes first arrived in the west with the command to deal with Pissouthnes before the Delians were returned to Delos in 421. His inference, however, assumes that the Persian Arsakes was in 421 the hyparch of Tissaphernes, as he is known to have been in 411; as Lewis notes, this is not a safe assumption.<sup>42</sup> It is not even clear whether Amorges was continuing the revolt of his father or had started his own revolt some time after Pissouthnes had been crushed,<sup>43</sup> although the former seems slightly more likely. In any case, if Athens' support for either him or Pissouthnes predated the launching of the Sicilian expedition in 415, as is possible, then the argument that the Athenians were overcommitting themselves could no longer stand.

It may well be that the Athenians, defeated in two attempts to control south-west Asia Minor by force, saw in Pissouthnes and Amorges an opportunity to achieve their aims without a large military commitment. As for offending the Persian King, the campaigns of Melesandros and Lysikles had both been conducted against subject states of Persia and hence were technically acts of war, yet Persia had done nothing; so the Athenians no doubt expected nothing to be done on this occasion. The fact that Persia did intervene was due to the Athenian defeat in Sicily and the belief that Athens was now beatable and could be forced out of Ionia. Athens' support for Amorges was no doubt held up as a pretext for Persia's break with Athens, but it was only a pretext. This is why Thucydides makes no mention of it; he is only interested in the real reason for Persia's involvement, which he expects his readers to deduce from his text.

With Persia's intervention Karia and Lykia became extremely important, since if Sparta could get a fleet from Persia they had a much better chance of bringing the war to a swift conclusion. Therefore it was in Athens' interests to try to prevent such a link. In addition, control of western Karia could assist in controlling Ionia. Furthermore, Thucydides at this point (viii 35.2) once again mentions Athenian merchantmen from the eastern Mediterranean, which the Spartans intended to capture if possible.<sup>44</sup> Amorges, however, was taken at Iasos, in what appears to have been a combined assault from a Spartan fleet by sea, as described by Thucydides, and Tissaphernes and his mercenaries (which seem to

have included a substantial Lykian contingent) by land.<sup>45</sup> This was a serious blow to Athenian strategy in the area, demonstrated by the fact that the oligarch Peisandros was able to have Phrynichos removed from his command because of his failure to save Iasos (Th. viii 54.3).

Further attempts at military intervention were made. One is indicated only by a small piece of information from Xenophon (*HG* i 1.10). When, in 410, Alkibiades was imprisoned by Tissaphernes, he escaped with a man called Mantiheos, who had been captured in Karia. Mantiheos was later a member of the Athenian embassy to Pharnabazos in 409 (*X. HG* i 3.13) and subsequently held a command in the Hellespont (D.S. xiii 68.2). He was probably a general in 410, but it is impossible to say what exactly his operations in Karia were.<sup>46</sup> Later, in 408, Alkibiades sailed through Karia collecting money for the Athenian forces (*X. HG* i 4.8-9). Presumably he brought many former allies back under Athenian leadership; Iasos at least was an Athenian ally again when the Spartan commander Lysandros campaigned in Karia in 405 (D.S. xiii 104.7).<sup>47</sup>

Karia and Lykia, then, were strategically very important areas for Athens, and many operations were undertaken to ensure that they remained friendly. These operations were, however, largely characterized by failure. This might be seen as contributing to Athens' ultimate defeat in 404. For the failure to control the sea-route from the Mediterranean meant that the Persians felt that recovery of the Asia Minor seaboard was a possibility; for this reason Dareios intervened on Sparta's side.

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<sup>45</sup> The involvement of a land assault can perhaps be deduced from *TAM* i 44.a.52-5, where Iasos and Amorges are mentioned.

<sup>46</sup> Westlake (n. 23) 162 suggests he was engaged on diplomatic activity.

<sup>47</sup> See Westlake (n. 23) 126-7.

### The auditor Thaumasius in the *Vita Plotini*

In his *Vita Plotini*, Porphyry recounts a colourful episode which, for a brief moment, brings to life the dynamics within the lecture room of Plotinus in Rome. The author explains how he was in the habit of posing questions to Plotinus frequently and persistently while his teacher was conducting his philosophical discourse before a mixed body of listeners. On one occasion, such an exchange between the two over the issue of the connexion between the soul and the body continued intermittently over a period of some three days, with the following outcome (Porph. *V. Plot.* xiii 12-15):

ὥστε καὶ Θαυμασίου τινὸς τοῦνομα ἐπεισελθόντος τοὺς καθόλου λόγους πρᾶπτοντος καὶ εἰς βιβλία ἀκούσαι αὐτοῦ λέγοντος θέλειν, Πορφυρίου δὲ ἀποκρινομένου καὶ ἐρωτῶντος μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι, ὁ δὲ ἔφη...

The first part of this passage has from quite early on presented editors and commentators of the text with a great amount of difficulty. Creuzer emended the text in the 1835 edition to τοὺς καθόλου λόγους εἰς-

<sup>41</sup> Westlake (n. 23) 105; J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London 1983) 130.

<sup>42</sup> Andrewes (n. 35) 5 n. 11; questioned by D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 80 n. 198.

<sup>43</sup> Lewis (n. 42) 86; Westlake (n. 23) 105.

<sup>44</sup> The importance of the area for the traffic of merchantmen is emphasized by W.A.P. Childs, *AS* xxxi (1981) 67; see also Hermipp. *fr.* 63.12-13, 22-3. For Spartan interest in Lykia, note the appearance of the name Lysandros on fourth-century inscriptions (*TAM* i 90.3; 103.2; 104.a.2-3), possibly all referring to the same man; see Bryce (n. 11) 162-3.